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INTRODUCTION

Recently, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure underwent a controversial
and massive set of stylistic revisions. The process involved "legions of
experts," took two and a half years to complete, and produced more than 600
documents. 2 The drafters insisted that this Style Project would not result in any
unintended substantive changes in the Rules.3 According to the Reporter for the
United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of

* Professor Duane is on the faculty of Regent University School of Law in Virginia Beach,
a member of the faculty of the National Trial Advocacy College at the University of Virginia
School of Law, and was a Distinguished Visiting Professor at William & Mary Law School in the
fall of 2009. He is a member of the panel of academic contributors to Black's Law Dictionary and
the co-author of Weissenberger's FederalEvidence (6th ed. 2009). He graduated from Harvard
College magna cum laude (1981) and Harvard Law School cum laude (1984). The author
acknowledges his gratitude to Professors Kevin Clermont, Edward Hartnett, and Joseph Kimble for
their comments on a draft of this Article.
1.

Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE DAME

L. REv. 1761, 1762 (2004).
2.
Joseph Kimble, Guiding Principlesfor Restyling the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
(pt. 1), MICH. B.J., Sept. 2005, at 56, 56.
3.
See id. ("This project was a style project, and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
took extraordinary steps to avoid making any substantive changes.").

41
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Civil Procedure, its goal was "to translate present text into clear language that
does not change the meaning."4 Indeed, the drafting consultant to the project
promised that "the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules took extraordinary steps
to avoid making any substantive changes" 5 and stated that "it's almost
impossible to convey how excruciatingly careful our process was for redrafting
the civil rules to improve their clarity, consistency, and readability-without
making substantive changes." 6
These stylistic revisions have resulted in a tremendous improvement in the
clarity and elegance of many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a
professor who tries each year to teach these Rules to a new set of law students,
my job in particular has been made much easier by many of the improvements.
But a lively controversy remains regarding whether this benefit was worth its
potential cost. Some observers question the value of this project, and others
predicted that any alteration of the wording of the Rules would inevitably result
in unintended changes of substance. In the view of one commentator, "[s]erious
questions exist as to whether the benefits of restyling outweigh the considerable
costs of performing this immense task and then in assimilating the product-plus
the costs imposed by the inevitable changes of substance inadvertently made by
the restylers, and the costs of litigating about those changes."7 Another skeptic
complained of "the near-impossibility of making significant textual changes
without changing meaning."8
That critic predicted: "If the Advisory
Committee's distinguished members, advisors, consultants, and reporter missed
things that I caught, I have to believe that others will catch things that we all
missed." 9

4. Id. at 1761. Professor Cooper added that "the new rules are intended to bear the same
meanings as the rules they replace." Id. at 1763.
5.

Id. at 56. See also Jeremy Counseller, Rooting for the Restyled Rules (Even Though I

Opposed Them), 78 MIss. L.J. 519, 521-42 (2009) (discussing the goals and methodology of the
Advisory Committee); Joseph Kimble, Guiding Principlesfor Restyling the FederalRules of Civil

Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), MICH. B.J., Sept. 2005, at 56, 56-57, MICH. B.J., Oct. 2005, at 52, 52-55
(same).
6.

Joseph Kimble, Lessons in Draftingfrom the New FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 12

SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 25,

25 (2008-2009).

7.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND SELECTED OTHER PROCEDURAL
PROVISIONS 807 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., Foundation Press 2009) (discussing in an "editor's note"

the amendments effective December 1,2007). One critic lamented that too much of the recent work
of the Advisory Committee has consisted of "obsessive 'restyling' and other silly tinkering." See
RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 308 (2d ed. 2009).
8. Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DA1IE L. REV. 155, 164 (2006).
Professor Hartnett predicted that lawyers dealing with the new rules would, at the very least, "be
able to discover and make plausible arguments that [a] new rule does not mean the same thing as
[an] old rule." Id at 165.
9. Id. at 164-65. In 2009, another commentator echoed the prediction that "there are likely
to be other undesirable substantive changes that have yet to be found." Counseller, supra note 5, at
565. This is the Article everyone has been waiting for.
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As it turns out, the warnings of these critics were prophetic. Despite their
best efforts, those involved in the Style Project accidentally changed the way one
of the Civil Rules now operates. This Article points out and examines that
accidental change, and explains how it will lead to significant complications in
the litigation of important issues in real cases, at least until the rule is amended
once again.
II. THE QUESTION PRESENTED

Consider the following scenario, which involves an issue that arises with
reasonable frequency. Imagine that you are an attorney for the defendant in a
civil case in federal court. About two weeks ago, you prepared and filed an
answer on behalf of your client. Upon review of that answer, it comes to your
attention that there were some important procedural steps you meant to take; you
are certain your client would not be pleased to discover that you neglected these
steps. (If it makes the story easier for you to think about or enjoy, feel free to
assume that you can blame the mistake on a younger lawyer at the law firm or on
an office assistant who failed to follow your clear instructions.)1o Let us assume
that the mistakes included one or more of the following three possibilities: (1)
You forgot to assert the defenses that the court has no personal jurisdiction over
your client, who is subject to suit only in some other venue that would be far
more convenient, and that the defendant was not properly served with process;
(2) You forgot to request a trial by jury, as you had a right to do; (3) You

10. One lawyer found that his client's right to a jury trial was lost, even though he made a
proper demand and filed it on time, because he failed to serve it in a timely fashion as a result of
what was (according to him) "a mistake of his temporary secretary." O'Grady v. U.S. Dist. Court
for the E. Dist. of Cal., No. 99-70117, 1999 WL 728524, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1999). Perhaps
that is how one becomes a "temporary" secretary.
11. Obviously I am listing the three procedural defenses, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), (3), &
(5) (referencing the procedural defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and
insufficient service of process), that are most readily subject to waiver under Rule 12(h)(1). I am
not including the fourth defense governed by that rule, "insufficient process," see FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(4), in order to keep this hypothetical situation as realistic as possible. In the real world, it is
virtually unheard of for any plaintiff to make that mistake or for any defendant to seriously raise
that defense (much less worry about waiving it). See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1353, at 334 (3d ed. 2004) (noting the rarity of
Rule 12(b)(4) motions). A plaintiff need only use the preprinted model forms provided in the
Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and even in the exceptionally rare case in which
the summons is technically deficient, a party can amend it with the permission of the court, see FED.
R. CIV. P. 4(a)(2), so that error would almost never result in dismissal.
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) (providing that the right to trial by jury, as declared by the
Seventh Amendment or as provided by federal statute, is inviolate). This is a matter of grave
concern to some litigants because the choice between a jury and a judge will sometimes make an
enormous difference in the outcome of a case. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by
Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 469, 477-78 (2005)
(citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AIERICAN JURY 63 & tbl.16 & n.1 1 (1966);
Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its
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forgot to include in your answer a third-party claim to implead a third-party
defendant from whom your client may be entitled to contribution or perhaps
even full indemnification. 13
The good news is that a defendant who neglected to attend to these details
when preparing his answer can sometimes correct them.14 But there is bad news,
and a lot of it. Even though the defendant may have a constitutional right to
demand a trial by jury or dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, a defense
lawyer who does not act quickly enough can easily waive those rights. Nor are
these unimportant matters; depending on the details of a case, it may make a
profound difference to the client whether the defense lawyer preserves the right
to insist on a transfer, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or improper service of
process, or a jury trial. 1 6 To make matters worse, let us assume that you have
good reason to believe that the judge assigned to this case would not be inclined
to do you any favors, perhaps based on your experience with the judge in other
cases or what you know about the judge's attitude toward defendants charged

Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 34, 48 & tbls.12 & 13 (1994); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity

of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1065 (1964)).
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (providing that a defendant must obtain leave of the court if
it wishes to implead a third party more than fourteen days after serving its original answer).
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (providing that a party may amend its pleadings with the
other party's consent or with leave of the court and noting that the court should grant leave to
amend when justice so requires).
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) (discussing waiver of the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction); FED. R. Civ. P. 38 (discussing the procedure for demanding a jury trial and the waiver
of this right).
16. Why do such issues sometimes matter so greatly to the client? The reasons are wellknown to any experienced litigator and not important enough for our purposes to deserve any
extended discussion here. Those who desire proof of this assertion need only attend to the fairly
significant number of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court with respect to the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to object to the
personal jurisdiction of a trial court. Every one of those cases involved parties who were willing to
undertake the considerable expense and risk of going all the way to the highest court in the land,
sometimes on an interlocutory basis before the case was decided on the merits. See, e.g., Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (personal jurisdiction); Burnham v. Superior Court of
Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (personal jurisdiction); Chauffeurs Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558
(1990) (right to jury trial); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (right to jury trial). And those
cases represent only the tip of the iceberg, because they do not include the far greater number of
cases in which some party petitioned without success for a writ of certiorari on those same grounds.
See, e.g., Vaughn v. City of N. Branch, 103 F. App'x 73 (8th Cir. 2004) (right to jury trial), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1065 (2005); Anderson v. Dassault Aviation, 361 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2004)
(personal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1015 (2004); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315
F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (personal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1035 (2003). It should also
be noted, however, that a "mere" dismissal for improper service of process or lack of personal
jurisdiction, although technically not on the merits, may effectively spell the end of the case forever
if the statute of limitations expired shortly after the defendant was served, as it often does. See
Advantedge Bus. Grp. v. Thomas E. Mestmaker & Assocs., 552 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gocolay v. N.M. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 968 F.2d 1017, 1021 (10th Cir. 1992)) ("[A]
dismissal without prejudice can have the practical effect of a dismissal with prejudice if the statute
of limitations has expired.").
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with the sort of conduct involved in this case. You are anxious, therefore, to find
out how quickly you need to act to remedy these situations, preferably without
needing to obtain the consent of the judge.
A bit of research quickly reveals the following relevant deadlines
1. The defenses of personal jurisdiction, venue, and service of process will
be waived and lost forever because you omitted them from your answer, unless
you act quickly enough to assert them "in an amendment allowed by Rule
15(a)(1) as a matter of course." 19 That rule "requires the party to act very
quickly" 20 because a defendant who wishes to amend his answer in that fashion
may do so only "within 21 days after serving it."21 These requirements "provide
a strict waiver rule,"22 and after the deadline, the court is powerless to overlook
the waiver, even if it is persuaded that the defense has merit and would otherwise
require the dismissal of the action.23

17. The deadlines enumerated following this sentence were slightly changed as part of a set
of revisions that went into effect on December 1, 2009. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee's
note (2009 Amendments). At that time, Rule 6 was amended to delete the provision that had
formerly excluded weekends and holidays from the calculation of certain deadlines, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were altered to convert almost every deadline into some multiple of seven
days so that litigants could simply reckon their obligations in terms of a specific number of weeks.
Most ten-day deadlines therefore became fourteen days, and twenty-day deadlines became twentyone days. See id. None of these simple numerical conversions had any bearing on any of the points
made in this Article.
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) (discussing waiver of 12(b) motions).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B)(ii).
20. 5CWRIGHT&MILLERsupra note 11, § 1391, at 514.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Prior to the amendment of this rule in
December 2009, this deadline was twenty days. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B) (2008) (amended
2009). This rule applies in the fairly common situation in which "a responsive pleading is not
allowed," ordinarily because the answer contained no counterclaim, see 5B WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 11, § 1345, at 37 (discussing when responsive pleadings are required), and "the action is
not yet on the trial calendar." See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B) (2008) (amended 2009). We shall
assume that both of these propositions apply to this hypothetical case. Technically, and curiously,
this deadline is not one of those specifically enumerated time limits that cannot be extended by the
court, see FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2), so perhaps in theory one might argue that this deadline could be
extended by a judge. But any amendment granted pursuant to an "extension" of the time to amend a
pleading under Rule 15(a)(1) would not truly be an amendment "as a matter of course"-that is, one
made without judicial permission-but would be the functional equivalent of an amendment under
Rule 15(a)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (noting that any amendment not made as a matter of course
must be done either with leave of the court or with written consent of the opposing party). The
federal courts have noted that allowing a judge to "extend" the time limits set forth under Rule
15(a)(1) would frustrate the letter of Rule 12(h)(1)(B), which declares that such defenses are waived
if they are not included either in the answer or in an amendment permitted as a matter of course.
See Ellibee v. Leonard, 226 F. App'x 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2007); Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d
735, 738 (1st Cir. 1983); Konigsberg v. Shute, 435 F.2d 551, 552 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Wurz
v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 423 F. Supp. 91, 93 (D. Del. 1976).
22. Glater, 712 F.2d at 738.
23. In most other cases, the failure to amend one's pleading as a matter of course within this
twenty-one day deadline is not a matter of great importance because even after that point, a pleading
may be amended with the consent of the court and the court is to grant such consent "freely ...
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2. The failure to demand a jury trial in the answer also amounts to a waiver
of that precious constitutional right,24 unless the defendant acts quickly and
makes such a demand in writing "no later than 14 days after the last pleading
directed to the issue is served." A party who waives this right by failing to
make a timely demand can, in theory, request forgiveness and a jury trial with a
motion under Rule 39(b). 26 But receiving a jury trial through this motion is an
illusory prospect for most litigants because granting the motion is within the
court's discretion, and "district judges have been extremely reluctant to exercise
that discretion." 2 7 Virtually every litigant who makes a late jury demand does so
as a result of "inadvertence" or ignorance of the law-but that excuse, under the
law in most circuits, either requires that the court deny the motion for a jury
trial,28 or is at least a sufficient reason to deny the motion,29 even if the delay in
making the demand was fairly minimal.30

when justice so requires." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). But that kind of amendment would not be an
amendment "as a matter of course," compare FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1), with FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2),

and therefore would not spare the defendant from waiver under Rule 12(h)(1)(B). See Ellibee, 226
F. App'x at 358-59 (reversing a dismissal for lack of proper service where the defendant waived
that defense by asserting it for the first time in an amended answer less than one month after the
deadline to amend as a matter of course); Konigsberg,435 F.2d at 551-52 (reversing the dismissal
of a suit for lack of personal jurisdiction because the defendant waived that defense by failing to
raise it until seeking leave to amend its answer only eight days after the deadline to amend as a
matter of course); J. Slotnik Co. v. Clemco Indus., 127 F.R.D. 435, 440 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding
that objection to service of process was waived because it was not raised in the answer or in an
amendment as a matter of course); Wurz, 423 F. Supp. at 93 (finding that the defendants waived the
defense of improper venue because it was first asserted in an amended answer only one week after
the deadline to amend as a matter of course).
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b)(1) (emphasis added). Prior to its amendment in December 2009,
Rule 38 required the demand to be made within ten days after service of the answer. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 38(b)(1) (2008) (amended 2009). For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that this is a
fairly typical case in which the defendant's answer was the last pleading in the case.
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b) (noting that on motion the court can order a jury trial on any
issue for which one might have been demanded).
27.

9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11,

§

2321, at 270; see also, e.g., Gelardi v.

Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 163 F.R.D. 495, 496 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citing Keatley v. Food
Lion, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1335, 1338 (E.D. Va. 1989)) ("This court grants such motions infrequently,
and ordinarily only when the moving party presents some exceptional circumstance, beyond mere
inadvertence, to justify the original waiver."). It is easy to understand why so many judges are
extremely reluctant to give parties a jury trial after they have waived that right; denying such a
motion will always decrease the length and complexity of the trial by eliminating the need for jury
selection and jury instructions, and will also decrease the risk of reversal on appeal. See Theodore
Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical Study of State Court

Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 130 tbl.1 (2009) (noting that the reversal rate in the
federal cases studied was 2 0.4 %for jury trials compared with 16 .5 %for bench trials).
28. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 356 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Noonan v. Cunard S.S. Co., 375 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1967)); Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403
F.3d 1061, 1065 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd.,
239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001)); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1973)
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3. The failure to implead the additional defendant can also be remedied
without the consent of the judge, but only if the defendant files a third-party
complaint adding that new party no later than "14 days after serving its original
answer." 31 After that deadline expires, the defendant may only imylead
additional parties if he makes a motion and obtains the consent of the court.
So far, this is all perfectly plain. But then things get a little tricky. All three
of these important deadlines dictate that the controlling time periods for the
defendant to remedy his mistakes began to run on the day that the defendant
served his answer on the plaintiff.33 To find out whether you can fix some or all
of these mistakes, therefore, you would need to check the file and find out the
precise date on which you served the answer. But let us assume that when you
go back through your file to see the precise date on which you served the answer,
the records indicate that you are now extremely close to missing one or more of
the deadlines. Maybe you have only a few hours left, or perhaps you have
missed the deadline by only a day or two; it does not matter for our purposes
which is the case. For one reason or another, the precise calculation of the
relevant deadline is a matter of exceptional urgency.

(citing Noonan, 375 F.2d at 70) ("Untimely requests for jury trial must be denied unless some cause
beyond mere inadvertence is shown.").
29. Andrews v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 544 F.3d 618, 632 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Misco, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 205 (6th Cir. 1986)); Dill v. City of Edmond, Okla.,
155 F.3d 1193, 1208 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nissan Motor Corp. v. Burciaga, 982 F.2d 408, 409
(10th Cir. 1992)); Farias v. Bexar Cnty. Bd. of Trs. for Mental Health Mental Retardation Servs.,
925 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Bush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir.
1970)); Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 1983); see also McCray v. Burrell, 516
F.2d 357, 371 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192, 197-98
(4th Cir. 1964)) (affirming denial of Rule 39(b) motion in the absence of "exceptional
circumstances").
30. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(upholding denial of a jury trial even though demand was filed less than three weeks late); Mega
Life & Health Ins. Co., v. Pieniozek, 585 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of
a jury trial even though demand was filed only five weeks after the deadline); U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding denial ofa jury trial
where demand for the jury trial was less than two months late and the delay caused no prejudice to
the opposing party, and noting that "the only justification for the delay was attorney inadvertence");
King v. Patterson, 999 F.2d 351, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a jury trial even though a pro se litigant filed his demand
less than three months late); Wienke v. Haworth, Inc., No. 92-1021, 1993 WL 6830, at *6 (6th Cir.
Jan. 11, 1993) (unpublished table decision) (finding no abuse of discretion by the district court in
denying a jury trial even though demand was filed less than three weeks late); Rump v. Philips
Lifeline, No. C 09-3271 SI, 2009 WL 3320266, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009) (striking a jury
demand filed only three weeks late, despite a concession by the district court that the rules
governing the deadline for jury demands in cases removed from California state courts "create[]
ambiguity and a trap for the unwary").
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (emphasis added). Before the amendment in December 2009,
the rule set this deadline at ten days after service. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1) (2008) (amended 2009).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1).
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1), 15(a)(1), & 38(b).
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But there is one possible glimmer of hope. It turns out from your review of
the file-no surprise-that you did not serve your answer by personal delivery to
the office of the plaintiffs counsel, which would have been rather unusual, but
instead sent it to opposing counsel by mail or by electronic transmission. 34 At
that point you dimly recall reading something about situations in which a little
extra time is sometimes available when a party serves papers by mail.
This set of facts is entirely realistic and squarely poses the following critical
question: In the fairly common case in which a defendant desires to take some
important action that the Rules only permit within a certain number of days after
service of the answer upon opposing counsel-for example, demanding a jury,
amending the answer as a matter of course, or impleading an additional party
without the consent of the judge-does the law give the defendant an additional
three days to complete those actions if, as will usually be the case, the defendant
served that answer by mail?
The remainder of this Article is devoted entirely to an examination of this
seemingly straightforward question. The answer, as it turns out, is not as simple
as most readers are likely to assume. Indeed, it involves some surprisingly
intricate issues of statutory construction, all made necessary as the direct result
of the supposedly "stylistic" revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. THE

EVOLUTION OF RULE 6 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
WHAT IT SAID BEFORE AND AFTER ITS STYLISTIC REVISION

Every experienced lawyer knows at least a little bit about the provision in
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that provides three extra days
when calculating certain deadlines that begin to run with service by mail.35 But
one important limitation was written into this rule from the beginning. For the
first sixty-five years that the Civil Rules were on the books, dating all the way
back to their enactment in 1938,36 Rule 6 provided three extra days to only one
party: the party to whom service was sent through the mail.
The original text of Rule 6 made this point plainly:
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice

34. Of course, it is permissible to serve the answer by delivering it personally to the
plaintiffs lawyer or by leaving it at the lawyer's office, FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(A) & (B), but that
would be relatively unusual. Such personal service usually involves a bit of additional
inconvenience. Service by mail is generally more convenient and equally effective in meeting any
applicable deadlines, since such service "is complete upon mailing," FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C).
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d).
36. See Letter of Transmittal from Homer Cummings, Att'y Gen. of the United States, to
Congress (January 3, 1938), in 308 U.S. 647 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
adoption of the "Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States").
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or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by
mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.37
That language was unchanged for nearly half a century, until it was amended
in 1987 to replace the words "upon him" with "upon the part, 38 and then
amended in 2001 to include methods of service other than mail. With those
two fairly modest amendments in place, the rule read as follows after December
of 2001:
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice
or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper is served upon the
party under Rule 5(b)(2)(B), (C), or (D), 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period. 40
Under the language of that rule, three extra days were given to "a party"
only if (1) the time for that party to take some action began to run when some
paper was served "upon the party," and (2) that paper was served "upon the
party" by mail or some method other than personal service.4 1 The use of the
definite article made it obvious that the party getting the three extra days was the
same party who was served with the paper that began the running of the party's
time to act. The original version of Rule 6 made this point even more explicit,
by announcing that the extra time was given only to "a party" after some paper
was "served upon him by mail."42
Under the version of Rule 6 that was on the books for more than half a
century before 2005, therefore, the law was plain and unambiguous. A
defendant or any other party who was required to do something within a certain
number of days after serving his pleading or any other paper would not receive
three extra days merely because he served it upon opposing counsel by mail.43

37. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) (1937), reprinted in 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 6App.01 [1] (3d ed. 1997).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (1987), reprintedin MOORE, supra note 37, § 6App.09 [1].

39. FED. R. CIv. P. 6(e) (2001), reprintedin MOORE, supra note 37, § 6App.11 [1].
40.

Id.

41. Id. (emphasis added).
42.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) (1937), reprinted in MOORE, supra note 37,

§ 6App.01

[1]. Up

until one year ago, the corresponding provision in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
explicitly made this same point, granting three extra days only "[w]hen a party is required or
permitted to act within a prescribed period after a paper is served on that party[,]" and the paper is
not served by personal delivery. FED. R. App. P. 26(c) (2005) (emphasis added). The clarity was
unfortunately lost, however, in an amendment to that rule that took effect in December 2009; the
rule now applies "[w]hen a party may or must act within a specified time after service." FED. R.
APP. P. 26(c) (2009).
43. This meant that service by mail would sometimes give one party a little more time than
the other to get something done, even if they were technically subject to the same deadline. For
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As the federal courts agreed, this three-day extension simply never applied "to
actions taken by a party after the service of a notice or other paper by that
party." 44
This result made plenty of sense and is what any observer would have
intuitively suspected. The obvious purpose behind the "three-day rule" is to
compensate for the fact that, although service by mail is complete upon mailing,
the party being served does not receive a document the same day the opposing
party mails it to him.45 The rule operated as a sort of presumption that a party
generally does not receive a paper served by mail until approximately three days
later. 4 6 It therefore gave an additional three days to the party who was waiting
by the mailbox for something to arrive, "to afford equal response time to those
served by mail."47 But no reason exists to extend that same indulgence to a party
who serves papers by mail. If a defendant serves his answer by mail on a
plaintiff, the plaintiff obviously does not see it the same day, but any defendant
who serves his answer has of course already seen it regardless of how it was
served,48 and can hardly insist that he deserves more time to decide whether to
amend that answer merely because he mailed it to someone else. That is the
simple and compelling reason why Rule 6, at least until recently, only gave extra

example, when Rule 38 states that the plaintiff and the defendant are permitted to demand a jury
trial within a certain number of days after the service of the last pleading, see FED. R. CIV. P.
38(b)(1), the defendant's service of the answer by mail under the former version of Rule 6 meant
that the plaintiffs time to serve a timely demand would expire three days after the deadline for the
defendant to do so. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (2001), reprintedin MOORE, supra note 37, § 6 App.
11[1].
44. Lewis v. Sch. Dist. #70, 523 F.3d 730, 739 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e)
(2001) (amended 2007)); accordMosel v. Hills Dep't Store, 789 F.2d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (holding that Rule 6(e) only "allows a party [that has been] served additional time to
respond, in order to account for the time required for delivery of the mail"); Hill v. Vill. of Loomis,
Neb., No. 4:09CV3061, 2009 WL 1813563, at *1 (D. Neb. June 25, 2009) (citing Lewis, 523 F.3d
at 739; Kabacinski v. Bostrom Seating, Inc., No. 02-CV-8910, 2003 WL 21250651, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 7, 2003)); Priest v. Rhodes, 56 F.R.D. 478, 479 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (rejecting the argument that
defendant should receive three extra days under Rule 6(e) to demand a jury, stating that the
"[d]efendant is the party who served the answer, and not the party upon whom service was made").
In reaching these results, the courts relied entirely on the portion of Rule 6 that referred to service
"upon the party," see Lewis, 523 F.3d at 739; Mosel, 789 F.2d at 253; Hill, 2009 WL 1813563, at
*1; Priest,56 F.R.D. at 479, which, as we shall see, is no longer in the rule.
45. See Carr v. Veterans Admin., 522 F.2d 1355, 1357 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that "the
probable purpose of Rule 6(e) [is] to equalize the time for action available to parties served by mail
with that afforded those served in person").
46. See Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 & n.1 (1984) (per curiam)
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) (1937) (amended 2007)).
47. Tushner v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 829 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1987).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b). This is not merely a common-sense truism; it is a legal
requirement. A defendant who mails his answer to opposing counsel before he has read it over
closely and thought about it carefully-perhaps to beat some deadline or avoid a default-is not
merely unwise; he is violating the rules. See id.
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time to the party who was waiting for something to arrive in the mail before he
could get started on his next move.
But the admirable clarity of this aspect of Rule 6 began to unravel in a pair
of accidental changes made by the Advisory Committee in the past five years. In
2005, the Advisory Committee amended the rule to read as follows:
Whenever a party must or may act within a prescribed period after
service and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(B), (C), or (D), 3 days
are added after the prescribed period would otherwise expire under
subdivision (a).49
According to the Advisory Committee Notes attending this amendment, its
purpose was simply to clarify the method for calculating how the three days
would be added.
The Notes contained no indication that the Advisory
Committee had any reason for shortening the phrase "service of a notice or other
paper upon the party" merely to "service," a change that the Advisory
Committee obviously saw as a mere stylistic improvement requiring no
explanation.
That stylistic change was carried forward two years later in the
more recent amendment that went into effect on December 1, 2007.52 According
to the Advisory Committee Notes, the amendment was "intended to be stylistic
only" and was merely "part of the general restyling of the [Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure] to make them more easily understood and to make style and
terminology consistent throughout the rules."53 As amended, the rule now reads:
When a party may or must act within a specified time after service
and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F), 3 days are
added after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a). 4

49. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) (2005), reprintedin MOORE, supra note 37, § 6App.12 [1].
50. More specifically, the Advisory Committee Notes to this 2005 amendment explain that it
was intended to resolve some outstanding controversies as to (1) whether the three additional days
should be added at the beginning or at the end of the time calculation, and (2) whether applying the
additional days to a time period of ten days would result in a combined period of more than eleven
days, thus no longer requiring the exclusion of intervening weekends and holidays. FED. R. CIV. P.
6 advisory committee's note (2005 Amendments).
51. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6 advisory committee's note (2005 Amendments) (failing to provide
justification for the specified change).
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (2007), reprinted in MOORE, supra note 37, § 6App.13 [1].
When this portion of former Rule 6(e) was amended, it was restyled as Rule 6(d) because of the
simultaneous deletion of former Rule 6(c). Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (2005), reprinted in
MOORE, supra note 37, § 6App.12 [1], with FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). For the sake of simplicity and to
minimize confusion, I shall refer to this portion of the rule in the text of this discussion simply as
"Rule 6."
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 6 advisory committee's note (2007 Amendment).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
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When one carefully compares this language with former versions of the rule,
the most conspicuous change is the deletion of the phrase "upon the party,"
which had previously appeared twice in the rule to clarify that it applied only
when a party's time to perform some act began to run with "the service of a
notice or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper is served upon the
party" by mail.
Those words are now gone, and the Advisory Committee
added no language to take their place. 56 The same ambiguity infects the title of
this subsection: "Additional Time After Certain Kinds of Service." Both the title
and the text of the rule now speak merely of service and contain not one word to
imply that a distinction is to be made between the party who serves a document
and the party served with that document.
Why did the Advisory Committee make this change and shorten "the service
of a notice or other paper upon the party" merely to "service"? The Advisory

Committee never gave any explanation for this unfortunate deletion and must
have thought that the italicized words were redundant, but that was only partially
correct. The phrase "of a notice or other paper" was indeed unnecessary
prolixity. (What else would you serve under the Rules-coffee?) But as we
now see, the last three words in that phrase were neither redundant nor
unimportant. The Advisory Committee may have been laboring under the
mistaken assumption that any time a party is subject to some deadline under the
Rules that begins to run with the service of some paper, that deadline will always
commence with the service of that paper upon that party by someone else.s" If
that assumption were true, those three words would have been redundant in the
former version of Rule 6, and their deletion would not change the law. But that
assumption is not true, for the Rules contain at least three important time
limitations that permit a defendant to take certain action within a specified
58
number of days after it has served its answer.
How does this change in the language of the rule affect the resolution of the
question outlined in Part II of this Article? The answer is inescapable and
unambiguous-and just as plainly contrary to what the rule said before the
supposedly "stylistic" revision. Rule 6 now states, with no trace of textual

55.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (1987), reprinted in MOORE, supra note 37,

§

6App.09 [1]

(emphasis added).
56.

Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (2005), reprinted in MOORE, supra note 37,

§ 6App.12

[1],

with FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d). The Advisory Committee could have easily preserved the sense of the
former language by rephrasing it to state that three days are given to a party (1) after he is served, or
(2) after being served, or (3) after service upon that party. For the first time in its history, the rule
now says none of those things.
57. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was, by its own
admission, influenced by its favorable experience with the earlier restyling of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, see Cooper, supra note 1, at 1762, which also contain a rule allowing three
extra days "after service." FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(c). But the critical difference is that the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, do not impose a single
deadline upon any party that begins to run when that party serves papers upon someone else.
58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1), 15(a)(1)(A), & 38(b)(1).
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ambiguity, that three extra days are allowed when "a party may or must act
within a specified time after service and service is made" by mail or some

method other than personal delivery.59 Under the only literal reading of these
plain words, three additional days are available to a defendant who serves his
answer by mail and then wishes to (1) amend that answer as a matter of course
under Rule 15, 60 (2) demand a trial by jury under Rule 38, 61 or (3) implead a
third-party defendant without leave of the court under Rule 14.62 As we have
seen, all three of these rules provide a strict time limit in which a defendant is
permitted to take some action after the service of its answer. There is simply no
other way to read the rule, unless one pretends that the deleted words are still
there.

IV.

AN EXAMINATION OF RULE
CONSTRUCTION

6 IN LIGHT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY

The unfortunate and accidental change in Rule 6 is a time bomb waiting to
go off. Lawyers frequently wait until what they think is their last day to get
something done, often after they have given themselves the benefit of the "three
extra days" to which they deem themselves entitled. In one recent case where
the losing litigant had sixty days to prepare and file a notice of appeal-a onesentence document that only takes one minute to dictate-his experienced
attorney waited a full sixty-three days to file the notice because he mistakenly
thought he had three extra days under this rule; the court dismissed the appeal as
a result.63 It is only a matter of time before some defendant will arguably miss
by one or two days the time limit for amending its answer as a matter of course,
or for demanding a jury trial after serving its answer. It has happened before,
and it will happen again. 64 What will the parties argue in such a case, and how
will the judge rule? The most likely arguments are easy to foresee and will
surely bear out the prediction of one critic that "the restyled rules will engender
litigation over whether to adhere to the current meaning of the current rule in

59. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (emphasis added). To be more precise, Rule 6 now applies to
situations where service is made in any manner other than personal delivery, including service by
mail, by leaving it with the court clerk, by electronic means with the written consent of the party
being served, or by any other means that the opposing party consented to in writing. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), & (F).
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A).
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b)(1).
62. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1).
63. McCarty v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2008).
64. See, e.g., Tushner v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 829 F.2d 853, 855-56
(9th Cir. 1987) (determining that a district court judge erred in striking a demand for a jury trial in
an action removed from state court, where the plaintiffs demand, by the calculations of the district
judge, was filed and served only one day late, although the Court of Appeals concluded that the
demand was two days early); Priest v. Rhodes, 56 F.R.D. 478, 479 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (holding that
the defendant served its demand for a jury trial two days beyond the deadline).
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light of the Advisor7 Committee Notes or instead to follow the plain language of
the restyled rule."6 We will examine the most likely arguments now, starting
with the most important.
A.

Is Rule 6 Plain and Unambiguous?

Let us consider the position of those defendants who will inevitably need to
persuade some court that they are entitled to three extra days to amend their
answer or to demand a trial by jury because they served their answer by mail. In
support of that conclusion, these defendants can make an impressive collection
of arguments in favor of reading the rule precisely as it is written, all of them
based on well-settled maxims of statutory construction.
First and foremost, the defendant will point out that courts should read the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with "their plain meaning," just
like a statute. 66 If the "statutory text is plain and unambiguous," the courts "must
apply the statute according to its terms." 67 As we have seen, no trace of
ambiguity exists in the text of Rule 6 as it is now drafted. The rule gives three
extra days to all those who are permitted to take certain actions "within a
specified time after service" 68 -and that is true of literally every defendant who
serves his answer by mail.
As a result of its recent amendments, Rule 6 now refers in unqualified terms
to any deadline that begins with "service," even though we know that those who
drafted the rule surely had a more specific situation in mind. But as the Supreme
Court has stated, "it is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the unqualified
language of a statute to the particular evil that [its drafter] was trying to
remedy-even assuming that it is possible to identify that evil from something
other than the text of the statute itself."6 9
Moreover, the Supreme Court has shown special reluctance to find
ambiguity in a rule or statute by comparing it with an earlier version of the same
text. In a case decided a few years ago, the Court interpreted a statute, just like
Rule 6, that was the subject of an amendment deleting a few words in "an
apparent legislative drafting error."70 In arguing that the Court should regard the
text as ambiguous and should therefore consult the pertinent legislative history,
one of the parties to that case reasoned, "for the most part, by comparing the
present statute with its predecessor," and by arguing that there was "no apparent

65. Hartnett, supra note 8, at 178.
66. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540 (1991) (citing
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989)).
67. Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1063-64 (2009) (citing United States v. Gonzales
520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997)); see also Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 685 (2009) ("It is well
established that, when the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.").
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d).
69. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998).
70. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 530 (2004).
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reason" why Congress would have intentionally deleted the missing words.
The Court dismissed that contention as beside the point, holding that "[t]he
starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text, and
not the predecessor statutes." 72 By that same logic, one is hard-pressed to argue
that courts should regard Rule 6 in its current form as ambiguous merely because
it produces different results from the version that preceded it.
Just about the only way to read Rule 6 in a manner that would avoid the
plain import of its literal terms is to assume that the Advisory Committee
intended the phrase "service" to mean "service upon that party." This would
require reading into the statute words that simply are not there-indeed, the very
words that were intentionally deleted in the most recent pair of stylistic
amendments to the rule.73 That would violate the maxim that courts "ordinarily
resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face."74
The Advisory Committee could also have preserved the former sense of
Rule 6 if it had worded the rule to refer to situations in which a party is permitted
or required to take some action within a specified time "after being served,"
instead of as it now reads, "after service."75 More than a dozen Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure prescribe a time Teriod in which a party may or must act after
"being served" with some paper. The Advisory Committee could have easily
used that language in Rule 6, and by doing so would have explicitly limited the
rule's provision of three additional days to the party who was waiting for some
document to come in the mail. To read into a statute a phrase that the drafters
were willing and able to use in other contexts "runs afoul of the usual rule that
'when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different
language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended."' 7 7

71. Id. at 533 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 17, Lamie, 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (No. 02-693),
2003 WL 21295241).
72. Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
73.

Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) (2001), reprinted in MOORE, supra note 37,

§ 6App.11

[1],

with FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d).
74. Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2009) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522
U.S. 23, 29 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128
S. Ct. 831, 841 (2008) ("We are not at liberty to rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning we deem
more desirable.").
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (emphasis added).
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i), 12(a)(1)(B), 12(a)(1)(C), 12(f)(2), 26(a)(1)(D),
31(a)(5), 32(d)(3)(C), 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A), 36(a)(3), 37(d)(1)(A)(i), 38(c), 59(c), 68(a), &
81(c)(2)(B). It deserves mention that the Criminal and Appellate Rules also contain several rules
setting deadlines requiring a party to take certain action within a specified number of days after
"being served." See FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(a) & 59(b)(2); FED. R. APP. P. 6(b)(2)(B)(ii), 10(c), &
17(a).
77. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (quoting 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER
& J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 46.06,

at 194 (6th ed.

2000)). This principle of statutory construction has been frequently employed by the Court. See,
e.g., Eisenstein ex rel. United States v. City of New York, 129 S. Ct. 2230, 2235 (2009) (refusing to
interpret "party" to include a "real party in interest" when the two phrases were used in different
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These considerations, taken together, amount to a powerful argument that
the language of Rule 6 is plain and unambiguous, and therefore must be enforced
according to its terms, unless perhaps there is some equally compelling and
countervailing doctrine of statutory construction that might justify a departure
from that plain language.
B. Legislative History and the Intent of the Drafters
In arguing that the defendant should not receive three extra days merely
because he served his answer by mail, as we have seen, the plaintiff cannot resort
to the language of Rule 6 as it now stands. Under the only natural construction
of the plain text of the rule, three days are given to anyone who is required to do
something after service by mail, regardless of whether the service was by that
party or upon that party. With the text furnishing no support for its position, the
plaintiff will have no choice but to argue for a nonliteral interpretation based on
what we know, or think we know, from the legislative history about the
intentions of those who wrote this change.
But in the case of an unambiguous rule like Rule 6, it is beside the point
whether its plain text arguably conflicts with the intentions of those who wrote it.
The Supreme Court has made this point in just about every way that can be
imagined. Because the courts do not "resort to legislative history to cloud a
statutory text that is clear,"78 the stated intentions of the drafters are simply
"irrelevant to the interpretation of an unambiguous statute." 79 Even in cases in
which the legislative history creates "a direct conflict" with the plain language of
some statutory text, "the text must prevail."80 When "the statutory language is
clear, there is no need to reach . . . arguments based on statutory purpose [or]
legislative history . . . .
Consequently, where the text of some rule is

unambiguous, the courts should "reject ... at the very outset" 82 any evidence
offered from the legislative history to prove that the drafters did not intend to

portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure); Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 222 (2007) (refusing to treat "claim" as synonymous with "action" when
various federal statutes confirmed that "Congress knew how to differentiate between the entire
action and particular claims when it wanted to"); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995)
(refusing to interpret a statute governing the "use" of a firearm to cover a firearm "intended to be
used," because another statute included that very phrase and therefore "demonstrate[d] that
Congress knew how to draft a statute to reach a firearm that was 'intended to be used').
78. Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994).
79. Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 n.3 (1989) (citing United Air Lines,
Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 199 (1977)); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1332 n.3 (2010) (stating that "reliance on legislative history is unnecessary
in light of the statute's unambiguous language").
80. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1466 n.6 (2009).
81. Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2246 (2009).
82. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567 (2005).
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change some aspect of the law that was nevertheless changed-even if only
accidentally-by that plain language.83
Nor does it make any difference that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are supposed to "be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 84 Even if a literal
reading of Rule 6 could lead to some sort of injustice, that admonition is not a
license for courts to construe procedural rules "to mean something other than
what they plainly say." The admonition to interpret the rules to secure the just
disposition of a case "sets forth a principle of interpretation to be used in
construing ambiguous rules, not a principle of law superseding clear rules that do
not achieve the stated objectives."
Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that it would be proper
for courts to look beyond the plain language of Rule 6, it is far from clear that
the stated intentions of its drafters should be controlling in this context. In
fairness, one must concede that the plain text of the rule will now produce results
that those who drafted it almost certainly did not intend. The earlier version of
the rule clearly settled that the party making service by mail would never be
entitled to three extra days,88 and the Advisory Committee has explicitly
disclaimed any intention to change the substance of the rule, insisting that its
most recent changes to this portion of the rule were meant to be merely
stylistic.89 But those assurances are by no means decisive. In two recent cases,
two circuits of the United States Court of Appeals expressed doubts that they
could overlook such ambiguities merely because an Advisory Committee
insisted that its work was intended to be stylistic only. The Second Circuit
pointed out that the Advisory Committee amended one of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure in ways that arguably amounted to an unintended change in

83. In Exxon Mobile, the Court was "presented with a bizarre proposition: a statute that by its
terms overrul[ed] [prior law], but whose drafters [said], in essence, 'we didn't mean it."' FREER,
supranote 7, § 13.3, at 770. As we have seen, that is a fair description of what has become of Rule
6 after its recent stylistic revisions. See supra Part III.
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
85. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 424 (1996). The Court was interpreting the
virtually identical provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 2
("These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just determination of every criminal
proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, and to eliminate
unjustifiable expense and delay."). The same reasoning would apply with as much force to the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
86. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 424.
87. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1761 ("[T]he goal of the Style Project is to translate present
text into clear language that does not change the meaning.").
88. See supranotes 43-48 and accompanying text.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 6 advisory committee's note (2007 Amendments); see also Cooper, supra
note 1, at 1761.
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the law, despite its assertion that the change was "intended to be stylistic only," 90
and concluded that this danger required it to "warn litigants of a potential
minefield." 91 And the Fifth Circuit likewise concluded that the recent
amendment to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although also
"intended to be stylistic only," 92 may well have altered the legal standard for
setting aside a default judgment. 93 Both courts thought it necessary to caution
litigants that the respective Advisory Committee had arguably created apparent
changes in the controlling procedural rules, and that they would not necessarily
disregard those unintentional changes merely because of the Advisory
Committee's assurances that they intended to limit their changes to matters of
style.
The Supreme Court evidently agrees with that conclusion and has indicated
that it will not automatically defer to an Advisory Committee's assurances that a
change in the wording of a rule involves nothing but a matter of style. In the
Court's only decision to date involving the stylistic revisions to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, after noting that the most recent revisions to Rule 19
were reportedly intended to be "stylistic only," it made a point of noting that it
had undertaken an independent assessment of the effect of those changes, at least
in the context of that rule.94 It comes as little surprise that the Court proceeded
on the assumption that the judiciary has the final responsibility to determine
whether the Advisory Committee succeeded in its intention to draft changes that
would be merely stylistic. Although members of the Court have expressed
different views as to how much weight the Advisory Committee Notes should be
given when interpreting procedural rules,9 5 a majority of the Court agrees that

90. Sorensen v. City of New York, 413 F.3d 292, 297 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting FED. R.
APP. P. 4 advisory committee's note (1998 Amendments)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91.

Id.

92. In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d 359, 370 n.29 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c)
(1987) (amended 2007); FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c); FED. R. Civ. P. 55 advisory committee's note (2007
Amendments)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kroenke,
858 F.2d 1067, 1069 (5th Cir. 1988)).
93. See In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d 359, 370 n.29 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
55(c)).

94. Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 (2008) ("The Rules
Committee advised the changes were stylistic only, and we agree." (citation omitted)). Those last
three words suggest that the Court properly regards itself as obligated to decide for itself whether to
accept the assurances of the Advisory Committee that the amendments have changed nothing but
matters of style.
95. Compare Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) ("Although the Advisory
Committee's comments do not foreclose judicial consideration of the Rule's validity and meaning,
the construction given by the Committee is 'of weight."' (quoting Mississippi Pub. Corp. v.
Murphee, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946))), with Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485,
2498-99 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion except for its reliance on the
Notes of the Advisory Committee as establishing the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(c)(1)(C). The Advisory Committee's insights into the proper interpretation of a Rule's text are
useful to the same extent as any scholarly commentary. But the Committee's intentions have no
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there are circumstances in which "the policy expressed in the rule's text points
clearly enough in one direction that it outweighs whatever force the Notes may
have." 96
These rules of statutory construction surely apply with even greater force in
the context of Rule 6, where there is no direct conflict between the unambiguous
meaning of its plain text and its legislative history. The Advisory Committee
Notes to this rule and all of its assorted stylistic amendments have not addressed
the specific issue we are considering here.97 The most that could be said about
the legislative history in this context is that there is a conflict between the change
made by the plain language of the rule and the generic statements by its drafters
that they did not intend to make any changes other than to the style. 98 That
hardly furnishes a substantial basis for disregarding the plain language of the
rule.
C. Does a LiteralReading ofRule 6 Lead to Absurd Results?

Apart from the arguments based on legislative history-or more specifically,
the silence of the legislative history to suggest that the Advisory Committee
intentionally changed the rule in the way identified here-the plaintiffs only
other possible argument would be to emphasize the policy consequences of a
literal reading of Rule 6 as it is drafted. The Supreme Court will countenance a
departure from the plain language of a rule only in the extremely narrow class of
cases in which a literal reading will lead to absurd results. The Court has often
reiterated the familiar principle that "when [a] statute's language is plain, the
sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition required by the text is
not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms." 99
One can argue with considerable force that it makes no sense to give a
defendant three extra days to decide whether to demand a jury trial or to amend
his answer as a matter of course and assert a lack of personal jurisdiction merely
because he served his answer by mail.1oo To put it in other words: there is no
sensible reason to give that defendant three more days than we would give to a
codefendant in the same case who served his answer on the same day by
personal delivery to the plaintiffs counsel. But although that result may seem

effect on the Rule's meaning. Even assuming that we and the Congress that allowed the Rule to
take effect read and agreed with those intentions, it is the text of the Rule that controls.").
96. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 602 (1994) (interpreting Rule 804(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee's notes.
98. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee's note (2007 Amendment).
99. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
100. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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unwise or unnecessary, it hardly amounts to a showing that those results can be
described as "absurd."
The Supreme Court has made it clear that courts have precious little
discretion to disregard the plain language of a rule or statute on the basis of the
results to which it would lead. Just a few years ago, the Supreme Court was
called upon to interpret a federal statute that severely limited the ability of
federal inmates to seek habeas corpus relief based on changes in the law after
their convictions became final on direct review. 101 The Court deemed itself
bound to give a literal interpretation to the plain language of the statute102 even
though this led to a bizarre conclusion that would, for many prisoners, "make it
possible for the limitations period [for a habeas petition] to expire before the
cause of action accrue[d].
In a masterpiece of understatement, the Court
acknowledged that this conclusion was of course "harsh" and "strict," but
nevertheless stated that the result was not the sort of "absurd" consequence that
would permit the courts to refuse to enforce the rule according to its plain
language. 10 4 And this was in a case, mind you, brought by a man sentenced to
thirty years in prison without any chance of parole, making a claim that his guilt
had not been proved in the manner required by law! 10
Even though a literal reading of Rule 6 will now lead to some strange
results, it is far from clear that the results will be utterly senseless or manifestly
absurd. At least in the context of Rule 38, which gives both parties the same
number of days to demand a jury trial after the answer is served, one could
plausibly imagine that the drafters of Rule 6 intended to expand its provisions to
make the deadline for a jury trial demand uniform for both parties-as the rule
now does-rather than having the deadline expire on two different days. 106 1 am
not suggesting that the Advisory Committee actually anticipated, much less
intended, this result. But the fact that we can imagine a plausible purpose behind
the change makes it much more difficult for a plaintiff to argue that the literal
reading of the rule produces such manifestly absurd results that every defendant
has constructive notice that the rule cannot be interpreted in accordance with its
literal terms.

101. See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 354-55 (2005).
102. Id. at 359.
103. Id. at 361 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority opinion did not deny that this was an
accurate description of the Court's holding. See id. at 359.
104. Id. at 359-60.
105. Id. at 355.
106. In at least one reported case decided before the 2005 amendment to this rule, a defendant
specifically complained that under Rule 6 the plaintiff served with the answer by mail received
three extra days "within which to serve a written demand for a jury trial, and that [the] defendant
should have the same privilege." Priest v. Rhodes, 56 F.R.D. 478, 479 (N.D. Miss. 1972). That
argument was rejected, but only because it was foreclosed by the language of Rule 6 at that timethe same language that has since been deleted.
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In deciding whether a literal reading of Rule 6 would be "absurd," it must be
emphasized that this is not a case where the plain language might lead to results
that one could describe as harsh or strict, that could cause anyone to lose
valuable rights through inadvertence, or that could unfairly catch either party by
surprise.
Because the most literal reading of Rule 6 is the most generous to a
defense attorney who seeks a few extra days to correct an error that might
otherwise inadvertently waive his client's constitutional rights, it is also the
reading that is most consistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and their rejection of "the approach that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome"108 of the
litigation. A literal enforcement of Rule 6 as it is now written will indeed lead to
results that are unintended and strange-but only by dispensing three extra days
to litigants who do not really deserve them. If the Supreme Court felt bound to
follow the "plain language" of a statute even though it sometimes resulted in the
denial of habeas corpus relief to possibly innocent inmates who had been
unjustly convicted, it is impossible to argue with a straight face that the
unintended generosity of Rule 6 would constitute a result so absurd as to
constitute a license to refuse to follow its plain language.
Besides, although a literal reading of Rule 6 leads to strange and almost
surely unintended results, one cannot push that logic too hard. Under any
conceivable interpretation of Rule 6, even one that would be most faithful to its
former wording, the rule is still fraught with lines that are difficult to logically
justify. For example, when a rule requires a lawyer to respond after being served
with some document-for example, a set of interrogatorie 1 09-Rule 6 never
gives the lawyer three extra days to prepare that response if the opposing party
personally delivers the discovery request to the lawyer's office and leaves it with

107. It stands to reason that an unintended consequence of a statute's plain language will most
likely be deemed intolerably "absurd" when it leads to results that are harsh or strict, rather than
unreasonably merciful or forgiving. For example, a rule that unexpectedly causes innocent parties
to lose valuable constitutional rights should be more readily rejected as absurd than one that (like
Rule 6) unexpectedly makes that result less likely. The Supreme Court has never yet said this, but it
makes perfect sense, and follows logically from what the Court has written in this context. See,
e.g., Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 465 (2000) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are designed to further the due process of law that the Constitution guarantees."); Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941) ("Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the
ends of justice, not to defeat them. . . . Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the
rules of fundamental justice.").
108. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). Moreover, giving virtually every defendant
three extra days before they inadvertently waive their constitutional right to demand a jury trial, or
their constitutional right to demand a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, is certainly more
consistent with the insistence that "[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice," FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(e), and that the right to a trial by jury "is preserved to the parties inviolate." FED. R. Civ. P.
38(a).
109. Interrogatories, like many other discovery devices in the federal rules, must be answered
within thirty days after they are served upon the party who is obligated to respond to them. FED. R.
Civ. P. 33(b)(2).
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the secretary. It does give the lawyer three extra days, however, if the opposing
party serves the interrogatories by email or fax or some other electronic
means. 110 What sense does that make? Electronic transmission of a document
never takes three days, not even in Elbonia. The framers presumably reasoned
that a lawyer receiving service electronically might not check his email every
day. 1 (The framers have not met any of the students I have taught in the past
decade.) But the same can be said when service consists of the delivery of
papers left with an office assistant; plenty of documents delivered by couriers sit
unopened for a day or two after delivery-and yet the rule allows no extra time
to parties served in that fashion. 1 12 The bottom line is that no reading of the
three-day rule in Rule 6 will generate results that are perfectly consistent with its
underlying rationale. That fact cuts strongly against the conclusion that the plain
language of the rule should be disregarded merely to make the rule "just a little
bit less absurd" in light of its supposed logic.
D. The Consequences ofNot Enforcing the Rule as it is Written

As we have shown, a literal reading of Rule 6 leads to results that are strange
and unintended, but not absurd. One could well argue, however, that a refusal to
enforce this rule as it is now written would indeed lead to results so intolerable
as to be absurd. As the Supreme Court has noted, it is especially inappropriate to
deviate from the "plain language" of a rule when reading additional words into
the text "would lead to absurd results."1 13
Only a plain reading of Rule 6 will eliminate the risk that the rule will
inevitably act as a pitfall for some hapless litigant who took it at face value in
calculating how much time he had to get something done. With good reason, the
Supreme Court has cautioned that a procedural rule should not be interpreted in a
manner that would convert it "into a trap for unwary litigants." 114 Indeed, this

110. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d) (giving extra time to those served under Rule 5(b)(2)(E) (electronic
service), but not to those served under Rule 5(b)(2)(B)(i) (service by personal delivery to a person's
office)).
111. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 6 offer no explanation for this rule. But it is
presumably the same logic adopted by those who included a similar provision in the Appellate
Rules on the basis of their view that "[e]lectronic service is usually instantaneous, but sometimes it
is not, because of technical problems. Also, if a paper is electronically transmitted to a party on a
Friday evening, the party may not realize that he or she has been served until two or three days
later." FED. R. APP. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (2002 Amendments).
112. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(B)(i) (addressing service upon an office assistant), with
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (failing to give three additional days for parties served under Rule
5(b)(2)(B)(i)).
113. See Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1487 n.6 (2009) (refusing to read additional
language into a statute governing federally appointed attorneys because such an interpretation
"would lead to absurd results" by requiring an inmate to secure "new counsel" in addition to his
appointed counsel).
114. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 147 (1993).
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very reason is at the heart of the Court's repeated insistence that unambiguous
rules be applied in accordance with their plain meaning.
If any unintended substantive change in the wording of a rule could be
disregarded merely because the drafters had made a generic disavowal of such an
intention, future courts and litigants would in effect be required to apply the
following bizarre maxim of statutory interpretation: When interpreting any
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, just to be safe, you must always be sure to go
back and compare it with the language of the same rule before its stylistic
revisions in the earlier part of the twenty-first century, make a careful note of all
the differences-and then disregard all those differences that changed the
operation of the rule in any way.
That principle of statutory construction-perhaps deconstruction would be
more accurate-would completely defeat the entire purpose behind the stylistic
revisions.
It would also make the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
mysterious and as difficult to interpret as the Seventh Amendment, and with the
passage of time would require federal judges to embark on "needless and
intractable excursions into increasingly unfamiliar territory." 116 That truly would
be absurd.
V. CONCLUSION

One proponent of the stylistic revisions predicted that advocates will "seize
on every nuance" introduced by the changes "and attempt to wring advantage
from it." 117
He even suggested that proponents of plain language
interpretation-which would apparently include me-will be engaged in an
intentional act of willful deception. "In the first years, the effort often will be
willful: the advocate knows what the prior language was, knows what it had
come to mean, and knows that no change in meaning was intended."118 To all
these sinister-sounding charges, I fear that have no choice but to plead guilty as
charged. But that does not change the inescapable fact that, as this Article has
demonstrated, Rule 6 has been the subject of just such an unintentional
substantive change.
Someday soon, a defendant will be accused of waiting one or two days too
long to demand a jury, to amend his answer to add the defense of personal
jurisdiction, or to implead a third-party defendant without the consent of the

115. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1761.
116. Chauffeurs Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 581 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). The
phrase is taken from Justice Brennan's apt description of the difficulties caused by the Seventh
Amendment's unfortunate use of the word "preserved" and the Supreme Court's resulting
jurisprudence that requires courts, when deciding whether a party has a constitutional right to a jury,
to undertake an examination of the eighteenth century actions brought in the courts of England prior
to the merger of the courts of law and equity. See id. 574-81.
117. Cooper, supra note 1,at 1783.
118. Id.
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court. That defendant, perhaps after reading this Article, will contend that he
was technically not too late because he served his answer by mail and point out
that Rule 6, by its plain terms, now gives an extra three days to everyone whose
time to take some action began "after service" of some paper. He will
persuasively insist that he had every reason to take the rule at face value when
calculating how much time he had to make up his mind. 119 He will also remind
the court that a literal reading of the rule would cause no real unfairness to
opposing counsel or deprive either side of some lawful right to which it was
entitled.
When that day comes, it will be difficult for the district court to meet all
those arguments with the response: "Well, you should not have taken that rule
literally, because your research should have led you to discover that the former
version of the rule had a few extra words that compelled the opposite conclusion,
and that the drafters who removed those words explicitly stated that they did not
intend to make any change in its operation." That reasoning would convert the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into an exercise in
cryptography. As the defendant will correctly point out, it makes much more
sense to interpret and apply the rules as they are written and to handle the
unanticipated consequences of those changes, if need be, through the normal
process of amending their language.
As matters now stand, at least until the next time that Rule 6 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is amended, its three-day provision is a terrible trap
destined to catch some unwary defense attorneys by surprise. As I have shown,
the best available arguments of statutory construction all weigh heavily in favor
of the conclusion that the rule should be enforced according to its plain language.
But that leads to some admittedly strange results that are not easy to justify in
terms of the underlying purpose behind the rule-which may well persuade
some district judges to reach the contrary conclusion and to interpret the rule so
that its earlier meaning is not altered. If that happens, some defense lawyer will
find to his horror that he has inadvertently waived some extremely precious right
of his client, perhaps even a constitutional right, because he relied on the plain
language of Rule 6 and took it at face value. How ironic that this ticking time
bomb has been unintentionally planted in the rule governing the calculation of
time.
The good news is that all of these problems can-and inevitably will-be
cured through an extremely simple amendment to Rule 6(d). 12 0 The portion of

119. Even good lawyers will sometimes have good reasons to wait as long as possible before
making certain kinds of seemingly easy procedural decisions. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct.
2360, 2372 n.9 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting on other grounds) (noting the reasonableness of
waiting "until the penultimate day under [a] judge's order" to file a notice of appeal since "filing the
notice of appeal starts the clock for filing the record, which in turn starts the clock for filing a brief'
(citations omitted)).
120. Indeed, the Advisory Committee has recently begun a discussion of whether Rule 6(d)
should be amended, although because of concerns other than the problem identified in this Article.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss1/3

24

Duane: The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that Was Changed by Accident:

2010]

A LESSON IN THE PERILS OF STYLISTIC REVISION

65

that rule that extends an extra three days to parties who "may or must act within
a specified time after service" 21 must be restored to refer, as it did for many
years, to parties who must take some action within a specified time after being
served. That simple change will eliminate all of the unfortunate problems that
the stylistic revisers created. As it turns out, a surprising amount of confusion
and complexit can be injected into the operation of a rule by the deletion of a
single word.12
But until the inevitable day when that change is made, a sobering note of
caution is required for those law students and defense attorneys who read this
Article before finding themselves in a situation like the one described above.
You should not take the liberty of presuming that you can take Rule 6 literally or
assume that you will be able to persuade the court that you were given three
additional days by the stylistic revision of the rule. That is a risk not worth
taking. You will be much better off in every way, and sleep better at night, if
you forget everything you read in this Article and assume that you do not have
three additional days. This Article has been written instead for the benefit of two
groups: (1) those future defense lawyers who did not see this Article (or this
paragraph) in time and are trying after the fact to persuade a court that they did
not miss a deadline;123 and (2) the members of the assorted Advisory
Committees and the many others involved in the amendment process who might
be tempted to dabble in "stylistic" revisions in the future. You would be wise to
proceed with caution. It turns out that the fears of your critics124 were prophetic.
It is exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to engage in the extensive revision
of the language of a set of rules without inadvertently making changes of real
substance.

See Minutes, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, 31 (Nov. 20 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/EVl 1-2009-min.pdf (discussing the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee's request for advice on whether the three-day extension should be applicable for service
by e-delivery and service pursuant to agreed means).
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d) (emphasis added).
122. In the words of one noted British commentator: "It's funny how one insect can damage
so much grain." ELTON JOHN, Empty Garden (Hey Hey Johnny), on JUMP UP (MCA 1992).

123. Good luck with that. As you can see, you have the clear weight of authority in your
favor, and the author of this Article has already written your entire brief for you. But nobody can
predict with confidence how a judge will rule in a given case. And that is the entire problem with
the recent amendment to Rule 6.
124. See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 178 ("[T]he restyled rules will engender litigation over
whether to adhere to the current meaning of the current rule in light of the Advisory Committee
Notes or instead to follow the plain language of the restyled rule.").

125. After completing the first draft of this Article, I reviewed the recently proposed stylistic
changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and found no fewer than four unintended substantive
changes that would have been made by the "merely stylistic" changes that had been proposed for
Rules 103(a), 411, 611(b), & 804(a)(1). See James J. Duane, Some Comments on the Proposed
Style Revision of the FederalRules ofEvidence, 1-8 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/

RulesAndPolicies/rules/2009/o20Commentso20Committeeo20Folders/EV/o20Comments%/o20200
9/09-EV-018-Comment-Duane.pdf. After I brought these changes to the attention of the Advisory
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Committee, it voted to change its proposed revisions to all four of those rules along the lines that I
had suggested to avert the substantive changes they were on the verge of making by accident. See
Memorandum from Judge Robert L. Hinkle, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules to The
Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 10,
2010),

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/jc09-2010/2010-09-Appendix-

D.pdf.
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